

# Paweł Gola

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## Contact Information

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## Academic Positions

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2015 – present Mead Research Fellow, Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge

## Education

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2012 – 2015	DPhil (PhD) in Economics, University of Oxford <i>Thesis:</i> “Essays on Two-Sector Matching, Status Rewards and Liability” <i>Advisor:</i> Ian Jewitt <i>Edgeworth Prize for Outstanding Doctoral Thesis</i>
2010 – 2012	MPhil in Economics (with distinction), University of Oxford
2007 – 2010	BA in Quantitative Methods in Economics, Warsaw School of Economics

## Fields

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Applied Microeconomic Theory, Labor Economics

## References

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<b>Ian Jewitt</b> University of Oxford +44 1865 278579 ian.jewitt@nuffield.ox.ac.uk	<b>Peter Eso</b> University of Oxford +44 1865 281483 peter.eso@economics.ox.ac.uk	<b>Coen Teulings</b> University of Cambridge +44 122 333 5203 cnt23@cam.ac.uk
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## Job Market Paper

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### Supply and Demand in a Two-Sector Matching Model

This paper merges a model of workers’ self-selection (across sectors) with an assignment model (within sectors). I provide comparative statics results for changes in the production function, the distribution of skill and the distribution of firms’ productivity. Any manufacturing-specific technological improvement that favors high skilled workers results in better sorting into manufacturing. If unemployment is positive, this raises wage inequality in both industries. Perverse output effects are possible: manufacturing might contract if the technological improvement favors low skilled workers. Finally, in the symmetric case wages become more polarized if both sectors start using more similar skills in the production process.

## Research Papers

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### **On the Importance of Social Status for Labor Markets**

Academia pays lower and less differentiated wages than other professional occupations and yet attracts large numbers of highly talented workers. I show that social status can solve this puzzle only if academics care both about occupational prestige and the position within their occupation (local status). If incomes are taxed at a sufficiently high rate, social status can induce arbitrary combinations of academies size and workforce quality even if academics taste for status is low. Finally, if there are further distortions present, social status concerns can enable the design of occupation-independent tax schedules that restore efficiency.

### **Occupational Sorting and the Structure of Status**

This paper investigates the impact of social status on occupational sorting in a two-sector matching framework. Social status depends both on occupational prestige and within-sector rank (local status). I show that the weights with which these components enter – the structure of status – play a crucial for equilibrium sorting and argue that most likely these weights differ across occupations. The greater the relative importance of ranks in a sector, the better workers does the sector attract on average, which has implications for payoffs, wage levels and inequality, and profits. Although the equilibrium is typically inefficient, this is caused by the externalities caused by local status and occupational prestige *specifically*, rather than by status concerns *per se*.

### **Mexican Immigration to the US: Selection, Sorting and Matching** (*joint with Michał Burzyński*)

We propose a micro-founded theory of international migration, in which continuously heterogeneous individuals endogenously sort into two labor markets and match with productivity-differentiated firms. Our model allows for investigating rich economic implications of migration policies, including wage, entry/exit of firms, market size and fiscal effects of migration. In a calibrated numerical exercise focused on Mexican migration to the US we find that imposing a prohibitive migration cost increases the wages of 62% of US natives – the less skilled ones. The main force that shapes this result hinges on the negative selection of Mexicans and their severe downgrading in comparison to US citizens.

## Teaching Experience

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2016 – present *Microeconomics IIA* (supervisions), University of Cambridge

2015 – present *Microeconomic Principles and Problems* (supervisions), University of Cambridge

2012 – 2015 *Introduction to Microeconomics* (tutorials), University of Oxford

2012 – 2015 *Core Microeconomics* (tutorials), University of Oxford

## External Presentations

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2017 Ce2 Workshop (Warsaw), University of Luxembourg, Econometric Society Winter Meeting (Barcelona, scheduled), SAEe (Barcelona, scheduled)

2016 RES Annual Conference (Brigthon), SSES Annual Congress (Lugano), North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (Philadelphia), WIEM (Warsaw), University of Huddersfield

2015 RES Annual Conference (Manchester), Ce2 Workshop (Warsaw)

2014 11th Young Economists Workshop on Social Economy (University of Bologna), Ce2 Workshop (Warsaw), Warsaw International Economics Meeting

## Honors and Scholarships

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- 2016            Edgeworth Prize for an Outstanding Doctoral Thesis in Economics, University of Oxford
- 2014            Best Paper Prize *proxime accessit* (€500) for “Supply and Demand in a Two-Sector Matching Model” at Warsaw International Economics Meeting
- 2014            Young Economists Workshop on Social Economy Award for “Occupational Sorting and the Structure of Status”

## Personal Information

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Languages: Polish, German, English

Citizenship: Polish

Date of Birth: January 28, 1989

Last updated: October 30, 2017